I started thinking about this because of discussion on another post, but thought I'd move it here because it was getting WAY off topic for the original post, which was about medieval pocket contents.

My question is simply whether we all mean the same thing when we say "Man-at-arms" This isn't a trick question, but a serious point.

I'm from the UK, and I know some other people on the list are, as well. For us, and maybe for people in the US working mostly from English sources, "Man at arms" covers anybody mounted and wearing a full harness. Terms like "Sergeant" are extinct by the c15th, so there really isn't much that slots in between a MAA and a mounted archer.

For people thinking in Burgundian terms, though, there IS something in between, the Coustilier. Now, that leads me to several possibilities;

a) Burgundians are deploying lighter cavalry than is used in England. Possible, but unlikely, since there's good contact between the two places, and I think the same distinction is used in the french ordinances of 1445 as well

b) What burgundians term "Coustiliers" and "Men-at-arms" would both be termed "Men-at-arms" had they been deployed on an English battlefeild

c) I've screwed up, and there is an entire category of lighter cavalry wandering round WoR battlefeilds that I haven't noticed.

This might explain why there's been some confusion over the minimum level of kit that a lower-end man-at-arms should have - some of the time, we've been talking about different things.

Any thoughts?

No, I think that those of us who study the military aspect of things 15th century are in agreement on this point.

Man-at-arms:1. A fully armoured man capable of and hired to do heavy cavalry service on horseback - regardless of whether employed primarily as heavy infantry or not.2. Someone fulfiling the traditional military role of knight service, regardless of social rank.

By the 15th century, most people fulfiling the traditional military function of knights are of course not knights (true on the continent as well). What was the total number of people holding the title of knight in late 15th century England? 100 or less? Not to mention most were lawyers, administrators and such first, with any military function following long after.

I think the lists for 1475 expedition list two troop types - bowmen (mounted and unmounted), and 'speares', a euphamisim for a man at arms. I have seen mentioned in various 15th century sources "scurrors", and it might be that this is a light cavalryman on the order of boarder horse - of course it could just be a mounted bowman acting as a scout as well. I do think that it is a good argument for a non-fully armoured cavalryman though - witness the use of boarder horse at Flodden within living (barely) memory of the last battles of the Wars of the Roses (why not "The Wars of English Succession", or "The Beaufort/Plantagenet spat".

The custillors continentaly are mounted swordsmen, armed with a boarspear or 'demi-lance' besides. They weren't expexted to have leg armour, and usually wore brigandines rather than breastplates according to the Charles the Bold's expectations (otherwise fully armoured). Tacticaly, they were used (apparently) to cover the awkward moment after impact, as the men at arms discarded broken or otherwise now useless lances, and picked up their saddle weapons. As Cavalry actions were near non-existant during the WOR, the need for such troops would not exist. That said, the Lancastrian Army at second St. Albans was preceeded by it's apparently mounted scouts (considering where they were from, most likely a bunch of Yorkshire & Northumberland cattle thieves who knew what to do when they saw their ememies with their hosen around thier ankles sitting on the pot, with thier backs to them) who descended on the disorganized Yorkists like the hammer of God.

When you get into cavalry stuff in England in the 15th century, you are unfortunately on shadowey ground. Dave Key argues pretty strongly against cavalry being of any significance (but some analysis of the Towton graves comes to the conclusion that these fellows were likely cut down by horsemen in the rout).

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If I'm understanding the Companies d' ordonnance correctly, the man-at-arms gets a lance for the charge, and a mace for close quarters.

This is fine armament for fighting mounted, but what is he going to use when he's fighting on foot? His english equivalent would almost certainly be fighting on foot using a pollaxe or similar, but that doesn't seem to be the model for the CoA.

The primary concern of Charles was to provide a heavy cavalry - which is what they were primarily used as. This was more successful on the continent than in England, but that role was indeed first and foremaost in mind.

That Said, the Burgundians would ocassionaly dismount their Men at Arms (Commines states that they learnt this practise from the English, and that the bravest and best of them would often do this to provide moral (and real) support as heavy infantry. As the companies of ordinance had 'pikemen' integreal (and the only pictures we can solidly attribute to show burgundian soldiers of the ordinances - the Master of WA engravings - show them armed with everything from Glaives to pikes and fauchards), the need for the heavy infantry was less. They fought on foot in the assult on fortifications primarily, from my reading.

In the series of engravings above mentioned, there are some cazmp scenes showing bec-de-corbyns and glaives being stored in a tent. Presumably, considering the evidence given by 'le jeau de hachette', Oliver de la Marches "Memoires", "The Deeds of Jauqes de Lalaing", and Commines commentary, for fighting on foot, your Burgundian man at arms would most likely have had a bec - in descriptions they always mention the 'malle', and 'bec de faucon', so they are reffering to the hammer variant. Of course pollaxes are possible as well.

Hope this helps.

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I don't know a lot about the Compagnies d'ordonnance (hell, basically I've read the osprey plus what I've picked up on this board) but every time I try to think how I'd use some of those guys in a WoR context, I start hitting things which make me think that things are getting done differently here compared to Burgundy....which is kind of odd, bearing in mind what strong links you have between the two places.

I'm just trying to sort out in my head whether these differences are real or a side effect of my ignorance about how the Compagnies are meant to work.

If they are real differences (eg my question about armament of a MAA), what is causing them? I'm prone to think it's the organisational structure of the compagnies (versus lack of it in the UK, on some occasions!) and enemies (after all, we're fighting near-identically equipped opponents, Charles is having to fight the very dissimilar swiss)

I'll just carry on trying to get my head around it until I puzzle it through to my satisfaction.....

Probably one of the best books you can get on the subject, exploring the continental view (in English) is "War and Chivalry", by Malcom Vale, University of Georgia press, 1981 (I think).

The large divergence in tactics on the continent and in England springs from several primary causes.

Firstly, the English commitment to their tactical doctrine. It was a winning strategy, and very devestating. Sometime during the course of the 15th century though, the numbers of bowmen to spears increases to the point where the docrine falls apart. 15 - 1 doesn't give you the sort of heavy infantry ratio that made the doctrine a winning one in the 14th century and the Agincourt campaign - you need those heavy infantry to stop the oncoming foe. I don't think this has really been explored fully - nowhere near the efect on the English occupation the Bandes d'Ordannance of Charles VII and his artillery train. I haven't made enough of a study of it to put forth a solid thesis.

Secondly, due in large part to the first point explored, horses of the sort required for heavy cavalry were in very scarce supply in England.According to the account books of Henry VI and Edward IV, the Royal studs were in a ruinous state. These studs, mostly kept by royal authority, and in earlier days mirrored by some of the great magnates, were hideously expensive to keep. Because heavies fell out of favor in English doctrine, the need to keep the stud farms running was lessened dramaticaly. Whereas in the Reign of Edwards I&II, great expense due to heavy demand was expended (different tactical doctrine), by the mid 15th century the demand was principly met by importing the few great horses or coursers required for avid participans in the tourney. Who would want to expose their prized beast for the tourney, to a battlefield dominated by thousands upon thousands of bowmen?

Malcom Vale points out technical improvements in armour, and horse armour - coupled with advances in metalurgy that made the heavy cavalryman viable on the continent once more - at least until the second decade of the 16th century. A brief renaissance - no longer does the man at arms dominate the battlefield, but he is made a usefull, nealy indespensible auxiliary to any army on the continent. He points out adroitly that the Burgundian army was impossible for the Swiss to devestatingly defeat (destroying it, that is), until Rene of Lorrain's allies provided the confederation with the Heavy cavalry neccessary to pursue and defeat in detail the elements of the Burgundian army.

Anyhow, an excellent book to read. You can really start putting two and two together when you read Prestwitch, Ayton, Vale and Contamine.

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I've got the Malcolm Vale book on order, but it hasn't arrived yet.

I'm comfy with the idea that the availability of warhorses in England seems to have declined disastrously at the end of the c15th (if only because Henry VIII moans almost continuously about it!), and that this decline may be more marked in the England than on the continent. However, this merely changes our question to "OK, so WHY was the decline more notable in England?"

If it is the English tactical system, why don't (say) the French wind up in the same boat, since they have essentially adopted a similar system of dismounted heavy troops by Agincourt at the latest?

If it is simply that we overdo the ratios (which I'm happy with as a hypothesis), WHY does this happen? Is it a deliberate plan, or is it simply that resource shortage means that archers are what we can do cheaply, whereas we can't do enough heavy infantry to balance the force?

I'm prone to think this is the case, since the ratio is later corrected at (say) Flodden, where the English force takes on and destroys a Scottish army that is trying to implement Swiss-style pike tactics.

Actually, the emphasis on heavy cavalry never went away in France. The doctrine that won for the French was battle avoidance, with a concentration on siege warfare - that is how they managed to oust the English. In the end, they forced an English field army to engage them in a prepared defensive position - playing the card the English normally played against them.

The English could raise an army to beat them for a specific campaign, but it could not long maintain that army in the field without a heavy victory - the king of England having the distinct disadvantage of being expected to "live of his own", and needing to call a Parliament to levy taxes - a Parliament that could refuse his request. Now war with FDrance was always popular since the reign of Edward III, but only if it was accompanied by a victorious field battle, or a stunning reversal of the French territorialy (both provided by Henry V). As soon as the king got bogged down, the next time he asked for money it suddenly became scarce, or grudgingly given at best. Normandy fell as much from the lack of money to support an adequate garrison as anything else - the Duchy being expected by Parliament to raise the neccessary funds for it's own defense.

That said, the French professional army raised by Charles VII, the 'bandes d' ordonnance' were purely a heavy cavalry force, a French lance consisting of the Knight/MAA, his coustilier, and a page/valet. The rest of the muscle being provided by the Royal train of artillery, and a allegedly practised militia (the Francs Archiers) provided by a middle class through the benefit of being untaxed as a participant. The Francs Archers were a disaster, mediocre at best, and simply tax dodgers with no interest in military service at worst.

There is no provision for a professional infantry (non-archer) in the French system, or a disciplined force of combined arms. This is what makes the Burgundian army unique in it's companies of Ordonnance. For the first time, there is a provision of all types of soldiers useful on the battlefield, with a tactical intent to use them together, and a drill used to make the force a workable one. At worst against their neighbors they held their own, at best, they were capable of a fast, well though out, succesful campaign, executed with professionalisim - I would direct to you the annexation of Lorraine in 1475 as an example of their full potential.

It took the Swiss, who no-one was able to come up with a tactical solution to until 40 years past the date of the Swiss/Burgundian wars to resoundingly defeat them - a defeat wich was not a complete one until the Confederates forces were joined by a substantial number of Heavy Cavalry provided by the Empire, and Rene of Lorraine.

I digress however. The problem with the English, and their unworkable ratio for a field battle is directly traced to cost. For the price of a spear, you can maintain several archers (more than several). A large part of the downfall of the English in France is their inability to change their system when faced with a different tactical problem. Nothing in the world makes a better target for artillery than a mass of bowmen drawn up to engage the enemy (save a Pike Block, I'd guess). The English were used to galling the French into attacking them in a strong defensive position, using offensive strategy to force the French to make a disasterous attack against a prepared defence.

In the last battles of the war, it was the French who in their prepared defences, galled the English with artillery fire into coming out of their positions, and attacking a prepared defensive position - with much the same effect they felt at Agincourt. Castillon was surely as big a disaster for the English as Agincourt was for the French.

The "Wars of the Roses" are another matter entirely, being "bass-ackward" from the norm of Medieval warfare, again brought on by circumstances peculiar to the English in the mid 15th century.

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Originally posted by chef de chambre:
Firstly, the English commitment to their tactical doctrine. It was a winning strategy, and very devestating. Sometime during the course of the 15th century though, the numbers of bowmen to spears increases to the point where the docrine falls apart. 15 - 1 doesn't give you the sort of heavy infantry ratio that made the doctrine a winning one in the 14th century and the Agincourt campaign - you need those heavy infantry to stop the oncoming foe. I don't think this has really been explored fully - nowhere near the efect on the English occupation the Bandes d'Ordannance of Charles VII and his artillery train. I haven't made enough of a study of it to put forth a solid thesis.

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Personally I don't think that this theory holds too much water. In the 1475 Campaign we reach what is probably the peak ratio of archers to men-at-arms (10:1) but this was never tested in the field so we can't draw conclusions, and where numbers do appear in other Indentures there are wide variations which make too precise a claim difficult to sustain.

In contrast where we do have evidence for 'combat' proportions, i.e. the Garrisons in early C15th English France the 3:1 ratio does appear to hold ... and this is precisely the period where the English are being forced back. Part of the problem here is the failures in pitched battles, yet these are only part of the picture, the territorial losses are occurring regardless of these, indeed campaigns like Talbot's in 1453 are in response to the losses not the cause of them.

So I feel the 'too many archers' theory doesn't really stand up too closely. Also although the archers were involved closely in the initial stages of the battles with the bow, even at Agincourt it was the effective combination of both men-at-arms and archers in hand-to-hand combat that swayed the battle.

This is drifting into my theories on the organisation of the English armies and how I don't fully believe much of what is written ... but that is VERY long story ...

Now as to the quality of an English Man-at-arms ... that is a very different question and unfortunately an extremely difficult one to answer since almost every indenture just says words to the effect of "armed as a man-at-arms should be" ... great!

My personal gut feel is that there was a world of difference between the quality of equipment worn by Men-at-Arms. Its alluded to in general terms in the Coventry Civic records which whinge about how the poor quality of other soldiers mustering in the city might be mistaken for their, obviously better equipped (?!), own troops.

Every record which list equipment shows a lack of standardisation, whether archer or captain. I see no reason to doubt that this reflected a general variety (indeed I doubt if Continental Soldiers were in reality ... not on paper/ordinance ... any different).

Ironically what is noticeable is how more armour appears in the later C15th soldiers rather than less (e.g. Brigandines replacing Jacks) ... had the English become too encumbered ?? Now there's a new slant on the issue!!! or maybe it reflects a greater need for centralised supply ... a reflection of less emphasis on military service and hence lower quality of troops? Certainly Commines relates to the inexperience of the English compared to days gone by. ere is the filing in my opinion not in the composition of he army but it's quality.

Actually, thanks for the references, they are very relevant. Just prior to the raising of the Ordinance companies in Burgundy - from the 1450's and through the 60's, they even had a breakdown in definition and scale of pay, as to wether a Man at Arms supplied 3 warhorses, or 2 warhorses. The ordinances finally did away with gradiation of pay based on rank, with all Men at arms recieving the same pay.

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Thanks in advance.

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Joseph

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Originally posted by Chris:
I also would like to reference part of a “payroll” from early in Edward III’s reign (14th century): “Earl 6s 8d; banneret 4s 0d; knight 2s; man-at-arms 1s”. Thus, you could field two MAAs for the price of one knight, when arguably the only difference is the negligible social status of the knight, not to mention the fact that squires and other MAAs were more numerable and easier to obtain.

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It might be worth considering the associated obligations that the different social ranks would have with regard to the number of men-at-arms and archers that an individual would be expected to provide.

Although the equipment of a knight vs man at arms might (or might not) be different the obligation to provide the men required, which is often alluded to but rarely actually detailed, might still make the costing logical and economic.

I think it is a mistake to make direct comparisons of military equipment from peoples and civilizations who never met in conflict. I believe the fact of the matter is that such technology and equipment develops to local conditions - climatic, social, and technological, both the peoples that create such equipment, and those that they are in direct conflict with. I believe that the equipment that evolves is ideal to meet those conditions, but comparing them to other items from other cultures that never had direct contact is akin to comparing apples to graham crackers.

The possible question you are trying to raise belongs in a seperate thread, with a well thought out or complete premise put forward, and not on this one.

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Thanks

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Yes, what you describe sounds like the equipment of a coutillier. In addition to the jobs you mention, the primary job of the coustillier seems to have been charging behind their man at arms in the charge (adding depth to the formation), and covering them in the moment when they have to discard their lance, and draw another weapon. In the few descriptions we have of them in combat, they seem to be employed almost as 'wingmen' to their man at arms. In at least one case, one was knighted for saving their man at arms when the man at arms had a horse killed under him.

They are more of a medium cavalry, sort of the dragoons of 18th & 19th century warfare, if you look at it loosely enough. That would seem an apt description, as from the clues of the Master WA engravings of Burgundian archers backed by pikes, there are more pikemen than are covered in the ordinances, and muster rolls of the companies would account for, and the extra men are armed with boar spears and glaives. The visual evedence hints at some of them dismounting to stiffen the infantry line.

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What type of saddle would such a soldier use, something similar to the Portugese, (certainly not a hunting saddle or one like Jeff Hedgecock made I would think), or is there a better example, and what type of bit? 1 or 2 sets of reins? What shape of stirrups?

Thanks[/B]

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Yes, such a soldier would use a light field saddle. A portugesa would be a good substitute, or a carmargue, or the like. A basic Medieval riding saddle. Military bits seem to have been on the order of straight curbs or something akin to modern Pelhams - then, like now with the modern rider, it seems to have been a case of the individual rider or horse having a prefered combination, or something they could work better with than other.

If you look at art, there seems to be a variety in use, unlike the 18th-early 20th century habit of having "issue" uniform saddle types, bits, and spurs. One of the most common equestrian finds is the simple snaffle bit, but I haven't seen them depicted in art showing military application.

Dom Darte's book (which is, translated "The Art of teaching good riding in any form of saddle" - *Not* 'The Book of Jousting' as it appears on the Chivalry Bookshelfs website description devotes much of it's pages to the descriptions of different riding equipment an their use - there are two chapters devoted to the form of spurs alone and their use. Contrary to some modern equestrian thought, a good deal of thought seems to have gone into the subtleties of riding, or the natural art of horsemanship, even by the 15th century - at least on the Continent.

In contrast, an extant 15th century English horse training veterenary teatise is the polar opposite with some of the most horrific and brutal training methods described - when studied by a doctoral candidate in 1992, with extensive equestrian background, who was also a veteranarian and a trained farrier, his expert opinion was the method described used in the English text would break a horses spirit utterly, and turn it into a frightened automaton. Guillaume de Lannoy, who was Philip the Bolds attachee on English affairs, and the Burgundian expert on the English method of war, wrote in a detailed paper to Philip that he doubted the English at that point (1440's) could fight effectively on horseback, due to their training, or lack of training in the art. His opinion of their ability as soldiers otherwise was very high.

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Just to jump in on this one, at least by 16th Century standards, a "Demi-Lance" was definitely "medium cavalry", on an unarmoured horse, but still fairly well armoured (in a good half- or 3/4 suit with burgonet and buffe) and with a heavy lance, rather than a "border stave" (the 8' lance mentioned above). Henry VII had a great deal of trouble gathering together sufficient Men at Arms for both of his Continental Adventures, and had to make do with Demi-Lancers. They CAN stand in the line of battle, but have trouble standing up to the furious charge of full Men at Arms.

One of the advantages of Demi-Lancers was that they were allowed to be mounted on geldings, rather than stallions. Men at Arms were invariably mounted on stallions, since a Gelding just doesn't have the aggressive spirit of the stallions, and is somewhat less inclined to complete the "charge" into another group of horses. (This also explains the preferred use of the curb bit...) By allowing the Demi-Lancers to supply themselves with geldings, a huge savings was therefore made by both the cavalryman and the paymaster, since even a quality gelding usually doesn't command the price of a good stallion. (Also one of the explanations as to why firearms became popular in the later 16th Century, i.e. the whole economy of horse-flesh).

There are a pair of interesting works from the 1620's worth looking into, as they both address some of this (although well outside the scope of this forum, unfortunately) by Gervaise Markham and Antione Pluvinel. Both address training and such, but Markham is very humane in his approach, while Pluvinel is, well, a tad less so.

In any event, there are some interesting bits of advice in both books which are carried on into the US Army's Cavalry manuals clear up into the 20th Century, so obviously there was some merit to them. I would make the unsupported leap that there was a lot of good advice in both books that was in fact handed down for many generations before they were published, too. Unfortunately, until such works are uncovered, it has to remain speculation.

Cheers,

Gordon

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Cheers,

Gordon

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